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BOSTON GLOBE
5 JANUARY 1980

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Saunders is a liability

The principal architects of President-elect Reagan's new national security structure are now designated — Weinberger at Defense, Casey at CIA, Haig at State, and hopefully Richard Allen as National Security Advisor. A strong antiappeasement policy to meet the threat of Soviet imperialism can finally be structured. This edifice however will require a new breed of national security builders and strategic planners at the second and third levels of government. The battle for these critical positions has started.

Harold H. Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs under Carter represents all that should be anathema to a Reagan Administration: bulldozer of the Shah out of Iran; dismantler of the Iranian Army's will when it was ready to act against fanaticism; blocker of Western assistance to the anti-Soviet Christian forces in Lebanon; appeaser of oil interests in the Mideast; wrecker of any forceful policy to obtain release of the hostages; accommodator of Mideast radicalism; the man who left his President unprepared psychologically for the Soviet invasion of Afganistan. Saunders' disastrous record is near endless.

Saunders surely retains friends in high places. Yet the American people are watching and waiting to see if Saunders remains in his present post; or, as a career foreign service officer, is given a respectable but innocuous ambassadorship far from the core structure of the new Reagan national security edifice.

LEE SAMET
Silver Spring, Md.

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NEWSWEEK
5 January 1981

PERISCOPE

Trying Harder to Find a No. 2 Spook

Vice Adm. Bobby R. Inman, who had been favored to become deputy director of the CIA under William Casey, has told members of the Reagan transition team that he doesn't want the job. Inman's withdrawal is considered a serious loss; head of the National Security Agency since 1977, he has won a reputation as a bright star in the U.S. intelligence community. Inman, 49, wants to retire from the Navy and make money in the corporate world. He is reluctant to become a second-in-command and is particularly aware of frustrations experienced by other military men in the No. 2 post at the CIA. At least five candidates, including three retired generals, are in the running for the job that Inman rejected.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
5 January 1981

Confirming the Reagan team

One of Ronald Reagan's chief supporters abroad, London's weekly Economist, has made a point worth taking to heart by all concerned with confirming the American President-elect's cabinet appointments:

"The system of Senate confirmation not only helps to shore up Americans' faith in those who govern them but also shields presidents from some possible future embarrassments."

The Economist wrote these words in arguing for an airing of the "drawbacks to set against General Haig's undoubted qualifications for the job of secretary of state." But, in the confirmation hearings that begin on Friday, none of the nominees should be given the perfunctory treatment that has too often prevailed in the past. A 1977 study by the public-interest group Common Cause found that, in the words of its research director, "the Senate hastily considered President Carter's most important nominees without the benefit of clear standards, full records, or tough scrutiny."

These benefits must not be withheld from any Reagan candidate in 1981. (Who would have thought that Jimmy Carter's choice for the unglamorous post of budget director, Bert Lance, would turn out to have liabilities left unexposed by the confirmation process?) But it happens that questions have been raised particularly about Mr. Reagan's nominees for the three top "foreign" spots — William Casey as intelligence director with new cabinet rank, Richard Allen as national security adviser, General Haig as secretary of state. To avoid adding any personal vulnerabilities to US national security problems, these questions ought to be cleared up sooner rather than later.

Since the national security adviser is not subject to Senate confirmation, Mr. Reagan would do well to provide some indication of addressing and laying to rest the specific questions about Mr. Allen. As outlined in the Wall Street Journal and elsewhere, these involve possible conflict of interest related to his previous government service. After the election Mr. Reagan announced "our people" have found "no evidence of wrongdoing" and "no conflict of interest." To which the Wall Street Journal reporter on the assignment said that "there has been no real challenge to the facts as presented in the Wall Street Journal." To keep Mr. Allen from operating under a handicap at the White House such unresolved allegations should be dispelled.

In the most conspicuous confirmation case, that of General Haig, the Senate will be doing neither the public nor Mr. Reagan a favor by failing to provide a convincing sense that all relevant information has been collected and considered. Thus the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee ought to act swiftly in support of the Democratic minority's request for such information from federal agencies. And the agencies ought not to hang back in providing the information.

In this connection it was good to see the present national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, deny that he was not cooperating with Democratic senators who had requested documents and other information on General Haig going back to the Vietnam and Watergate years of his controversial service to Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. He said he would certainly supply documents if specifically identified and determined to be properly available to the senators.

But Mr. Brzezinski's reported direct reply to the request seemed to stress the obstacles to cooperation rather than an effort to ease the overcoming of them. It will be important for both the senators and the executive branch to follow through on ensuring that everything needed is available and examined.

It was unnecessarily diversionary for Mr. Brzezinski immediately to raise specters of a "witch hunt," whether by the senators, as he first seemed to imply — or by the press, as his news spokesman said he meant. The danger of a witch hunt, indeed, may be the greater if people take high office without the benefit of a full airing of whatever drawbacks as well as strengths there may be.

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MOBILE PRESS (AL)
1 January 1981

Inman is favorite for CIA deputy director

By PHILIP W. SMITH
Press-Register
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Vice Adm. Bobby Ray Inman, the Reagan transition team's top choice for deputy director of the CIA, would bring to the agency a knowledge of modern, electronic intelligence-gathering techniques that Director-designate William J. Casey lacks.

While Inman's nomination for the No. 2 CIA job isn't yet certain, transition team sources say he is the clear favorite.

Inman is director of the super-secret National Security Agency, which monitors communication networks worldwide with satellites and other electronic methods, and attempts to break the secret codes of other nations.

The NSA, which has headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., is the most secret of all U.S. intelligence organizations. Inman has headed it since 1977.

Casey, a personal friend of Reagan and his national campaign director, was an intelligence officer in the World War II Office of Strategic Services. But he has had no intelligence experience since the late 1940s when he served on a presidential commission that recommended the establishment of the CIA.

His lack of experience with modern electronic spy techniques has been a source of concern to some members of Reagan's national security transition advisers.

Inman's long experience in that field as a career naval intelligence officer would more than offset Casey's lack of knowledge of electronic data-gathering, according to transition staff officials.

A 28-year Navy veteran, Inman, 49, was deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA's military counterpart, in 1976 and 1977 before being named director of NSA by President Carter.

Prior to his tour as the No. 2 officer at the DIA, Inman, a Texas native and University of Texas graduate, was assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the Pacific Fleet and director of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington.

Because he is not a Navy "line" officer, Inman normally would not be promoted to full admiral and would probably retire at the end of his current tour of duty as director of NSA if he does not move to the CIA. Reagan could promote him to admiral in the CIA job.

Inman has a reputation among senior Navy officers as a good administrator, another factor in his favor with the Reagan talent scouts. As deputy director, he would be in charge of much of the day-to-day administration of the CIA.

Casey does not like to deal with detailed administrative chores, according to former Reagan campaign officials who worked with him during the past year.

The nomination of Inman also would continue the CIA tradition of having one civilian and one military officer in the top two jobs.

The departing director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, is a career naval officer, and his deputy, Frank Carlucci, is a civilian.

Over the past 30 years, the director usually has been a civilian and his deputy a senior military intelligence officer.

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THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
January 1981

Letters

Colby en Francais

Mr. Joseph Nocera certainly made a detailed comparison of the French and English editions of my book, *Honorable Men* ["Le Couvert Blown," November]. Most of the variation he spotted, however, are minor editorial changes made at the American and French publishing houses, with which the CIA had no connection and which did not go beyond what CIA had reviewed.

Contrary to Mr. Nocera's assertion, I provided CIA with the final typed copy of the text, not the galley proof. The agency asked that I make only two substantial changes, those affecting the Glomar Explorer and the mention of my former chief's name. As I indicated in the book I did not really agree with either of these but certainly accepted CIA's right under my contract to make this decision, even if mistaken, as the purpose was not censorship but protection of classified information. I still regret that an unintentional communication failure caused the French edition to be issued without the excisions CIA requested. Most of the other variations would in that case still have appeared to Mr. Nocera's sharp comparison, but he would not have come to the erroneous explanation that he has deduced. Mr. Nocera could have learned this if he had communicated with me in the course of his research.

Only in one respect do I agree with Mr. Nocera, that we would be better off if we had criminal sanctions for the revelation of sensitive intelligence information by ex-officers. In testimony to the Congress I indicated that this is so important that I would be willing to surrender the kind of prior review required by the secrecy agreements in order to achieve it. In the absence of such legislation, however, it is only reasonable that CIA exert such control as it can through the secrecy agreement, as has been affirmed by the courts.

WILLIAM E. COLBY
New York, New York

The author replies:

The "variations" referred to by Colby consist of omissions from the English text of *Honorable Men* concerning such items as the CIA's use of AID cover, the discovery of secret Warsaw Pact documents, the close relations between the CIA and the AFL-CIO, and Colby's disagreements with CIA officials Richard Helms and James Angleton. Maybe these deletions were, as he claims, "minor editorial changes," but there is such a dearth of detail in the book that it struck me as highly unlikely that Simon and Schuster, of its own volition, would have struck from the book the few decent details Colby provided. In addition, Colby's use of phrases in his letter like "substantial changes" and "*most* of the other changes" implies that the CIA did indeed require other changes—they just weren't, in Colby's view, "substantial." Of course, that was precisely the point I was trying to make—that the changes I found were so insubstantial that it seemed absurd the deletions had been made in the first place.

The other point I was trying to make—namely that the CIA's treatment of Colby points up glaringly the double standard the agency uses in enforcing its secrecy agreement—comes through loud and clear in Colby's letter. It's nice to see that Colby now "regrets" his "failure," but that hardly changes the fact that it occurred; and that for basically the same "failure" Frank Snepp was punished rather severely. For Colby, it was just a little slip-up, quickly forgotten as he got on with his life. Frank Snepp cannot say the same.